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The science literacy paradox: Why really smart people tend to have the most biased opinions

September 1, 2016 —When presented with contradictory evidence about a politically contentious issue, it’s easy to fall into the trap of reacting emotionally and negatively to that information rather than responding with an open mind. We may not only discount or dismiss such evidence, we are also likely to quickly call into question the credibility of the source. “Motivated reasoning,” defined as the “systematic biasing of judgments in favor of one’s immediately accessible beliefs and feelings,” write political psychologists Milton Lodge and Charles Taber (2013), is “. . . built into the basic architecture of information processing mechanisms of the brain” (p. 24).

But here is the surprising paradox: studies show that in politically contentious science debates, it is the best educated and most scientifically literate who are the most prone to motivated reasoning. Researchers differ slightly in their explanations for this paradox, but studies suggest that strong partisans with higher science literacy and education levels tend to be more adept at recognizing and seeking out congenial arguments, are more attuned to what others like them think about the matter, are more likely to react to these cues in ideologically consistent ways, and tend to be more personally skilled at offering arguments to support and reinforce their preexisting positions (Haidt 2012; Kahan 2015).

The intensity and proficiency with which really smart people argue against challenging evidence explains why brokering agreement on issues such as climate change, natural gas fracking, nuclear energy, evolution, and other issues is so challenging. There is no obvious solution to this paradoxical bind, and there is no easy path around the barrier of our inconvenient minds. But in talking with others, we can adopt specific practices that may at least partially defuse the biased processing of information, opening up a space for dialogue and cooperation.

Our Knowledge-Based Differences

Over the past decade, researchers studying science-related controversies via public opinion surveys and experiments have documented numerous instances of smart people disagreeing in politically motivated ways. For example—contrary to overwhelming scientific consensus—studies find that better educated conservatives who score higher on measures of basic science literacy are more likely to doubt the human causes of climate change. Their beliefs about climate science conform to their sense of what others like them believe, the dismissive arguments of conservative political leaders and media sources, and their sense that actions to address climate change would mean more government regulation, which conservatives tend to oppose (Kahan 2015).

Source: Kahan (2015).

Lest you think that conservatives are uniquely biased against scientific evidence, other research shows that better educated liberals engage in similar biased processing of expert advice when forming opinions about natural gas fracking and nuclear energy. In this case, their opinions reflect what others like them believe, the alarming arguments of liberal political leaders and media sources, and their skepticism toward technologies identified with “Big Oil” and industry (Nisbet et al. 2015).

A similar relationship between science literacy and ideology has been observed regarding support for government funding of scientific research. Liberals and conservatives who score low on science literacy tend to hold equivalent levels of support for science funding. But as science literacy increases, conservatives grow more opposed to funding while liberals grow more supportive, a shift in line with their differing beliefs about the role of government in society (Gauchat 2015).

The polarizing effects of knowledge have also been observed in relation to religiosity and beliefs about evolution. In this case, greater science literacy predicts doubts about evolution among the most religious but acceptance of evolution among the more secular (Kahan 2015). But isn’t belief in evolution an indicator of science literacy? Rather than measuring scientific knowledge, studies show that questions about evolution tend to measure a commitment to a specific religious tradition or outlook. Many in the public are aware of the scientifically correct answer to questions about evolution, but if not otherwise prompted, by way of a process of motivated reasoning they are inclined to answer in terms of their religious views (Roos 2014).

For example, in 2012 when half of survey respondents were asked by the U.S. National Science Board to answer true or false, “Human beings, as we know them today, developed from earlier species of animals,” 48 percent of those questioned answered “true.” But among the other half of the survey sample, those who were asked “According to the theory of evolution, human beings, as we know them today, developed from earlier species of animals,” 74 percent answered “true.” A similar difference in response occurs when a true or false question about the big bang is prefaced with “According to astronomers, the universe began with a big explosion” (National Science Board 2014). (See also, SI, “Science Indicators 2014. . . .” May/June 2014.)

Because they are politically contested issues, asking people whether they believe in evolution, the existence of climate change, or the safety of nuclear energy is equivalent to asking people with which social group they identify. As a result, people’s responses to these questions do not reflect what people know factually about the issue or how people interpret and integrate the knowledge that they hold. Instead, such questions reflect people’s core political and religious identities. In sum, our beliefs about contentious science issues reflect who we are socially. The better educated we are, the more adept we are at recognizing the connection between a contested issue and our group identity (Kahan 2015).

A Different Kind of Conversation

To overcome motivated reasoning on topics such as climate change or evolution, some research suggests that we should look for opportunities to explicitly explain the uncertainty relative to scientific understanding and to be fully transparent in how scientific conclusions are reached and how uncertainty is reduced. From this view, it is a mistake to reply to challenges to scientific authority by arguing that the “science is settled.” A scientist’s credibility, write communication researchers Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Bruce Hardy (2014), depends on communicating that she is “faithful to a valuable way of knowing, dedicated to sharing what she knows within the methods available to her community, and committed to subjecting what she knows and how she knows it to scrutiny and hence, correction by her peers, journalists, and the public.”

Political scientist James Druckman (2015) echoes similar recommendations for overcoming motivated reasoning. A key strategy is to communicate when possible about consensus evidence endorsed by a diversity of experts, make transparent how scientific results were derived, and avoid conflating scientific information with values that may vary among the public. In this case, he emphasizes the importance of “values diversity,” in which scientists avoid offering value-laden scientific information, defining for the public a “good” or “competent” decision or policy outcome. Rather than arguing on behalf of a specific outcome, experts should work to ensure relevant science is used or at least consulted in making a policy decision.

Research by Yale University’s Dan Kahan (2010) and colleagues suggests that a possible effective strategy for overcoming biased information processing is to “present information in a manner that affirms rather than threatens people’s values.” People tend to doubt or reject expert information that could lead to restrictions on social activities that they value, but Kahan’s research shows that if they are provided with information that upholds those values, they react more open-mindedly.

For example, conservatives tend to doubt expert advice about climate change because they see it as aligned with regulations and other actions that restrict commerce and industry. Yet Kahan’s research shows that conservatives tend to look at the same evidence more favorably when they are made aware that “the possible responses to climate change include nuclear power and geo-engineering, enterprises that to them symbolize human resourcefulness.”

Cultivating Reasoning Skills

In response to research demonstrating the polarizing effects of basic science literacy, decision scientists Caitlin Drummond and Baruch Fischhoff (2015) in a recent study focused instead on testing the role of more fundamental scientific reasoning skills. If individuals possessed the skills to think and reason like a scientist, could this trump the tendency for really smart people to rely on their political and social identities in forming opinions about controversial subjects?

Drummond and Fischoff asked survey subjects eleven questions that measure the skills needed to demonstrate competence in evaluating scientific evidence or to “think like a scientist.” These questions asked about double-blind experiments, causality, confounding variables, construct validity, control groups, ecological validity, history and maturation effects in surveys or experiments, measurement reliability, and response bias.

Respondents on average answered seven of these eleven questions correctly. Individuals who scored higher on the scientific reasoning scale were better educated, more open-minded, and tended to be older. Of particular interest, scientific reasoning ability was unrelated to either political ideology or religiosity. After controlling for several confounding factors, higher scores on the scientific reasoning scale consistently predicted acceptance of the scientific consensus on vaccines, genetically modified foods, and human evolution but not climate change or the big bang. In a skills test, individuals scoring higher on the scientific reasoning scale were also more likely to correctly interpret numerical information regarding the effectiveness and side effects of certain drugs.

Based on these findings, scientific reasoning skills appear to be predictive of attitudes consistent with scientific consensus on highly contested issues (though not on climate change). The challenge is that such skills are not easily acquired once formal education ends, leaving few if any effective communication strategies for bolstering scientific reasoning among the adult population. Nevertheless, the research findings underscore the importance of teaching scientific reasoning skills as part of the high school and college-level curricula to as broad a segment of the student population as possible. At the college level, an easy first step would be to ensure that students take a greater number of rigorous science and social science courses as part of their general education requirements.


–This article appeared in the Sept./Oct. 2016 issue of Skeptical Inquirer magazine.

Citation:

Nisbet, M.C. (2016). The Science Literacy Paradox: Why Really Smart People Often Have the Most Biased Opinions. Skeptical Inquirer, 40 (5), 21-23.

References

  • Druckman, J.N. 2015. Communicating policy-relevant science. PS: Political Science & Politics 48(S1): 58–69.Drummond, C., and B. Fischhoff. 2015. Development and validation of the scientific reasoning scale. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making.
  • Gauchat, G. 2015. The political context of science in the United States: Public acceptance of evidence-based policy and science funding. Social Forces 2: 723–746.
  • Haidt, J. 2012. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. New York: Vintage.
  • Jamieson, K.H., and B.W. Hardy. 2014. Leveraging scientific credibility about Arctic sea ice trends in a polarized political environment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111(Supplement 4): 13598–13605.
  • Kahan, D. 2010. Fixing the communications failure. Nature 463(7279): 296–297.
  • ———. 2015. Climate science communication and the measurement problem. Political Psychology 36(S1): 1–43.
  • Lodge, M., and C.S. Taber. 2013. The Rationalizing Voter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • National Science Board. 2014. Science and Engineering Indicators 2014. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation.
  • Nisbet, E.C., K.E. Cooper, and R.K. Garrett. 2015. The partisan brain: How dissonant science messages lead conservatives and liberals to (dis) trust science. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 658(1): 36–66.
  • Roos, J.M. 2014. Measuring science or religion? A measurement analysis of the National Science Foundation sponsored science literacy scale 2006–2010. Public Understanding of Science 23(7): 797–813.

Climate change communication, energy politics, and journalism: Syllabus and schedule

September 1, 2016--In this advanced seminar, students apply research and best practices to communicating about and reporting on climate change and energy issues. Course work prepares students for careers in journalism, advocacy, government, and strategic communication. Students analyze major debates over the environment, climate change, and related technologies; assessing how they are portrayed by experts, advocates, and the media; and the implications for effective journalism, communication, and policymaker engagement.  Students gain an integrated understanding of the different roles they can play as professionals, advocates, citizens, and consumers. In doing so, they will have improved their ability to find, discuss, evaluate, and use expert sources of information; assess competing media claims and narratives; think strategically and critically; and write impactful, evidence-based news stories, analyses, and commentaries. Stories are published at the New England Climate Change Review, a website covering climate and energy in New England and beyond.

COURSE ASSIGNMENTS

  • Reading Familiarity Quizzes (10%): Each Tuesday class will begin with a short quiz testing your familiarity with the assigned readings and the previous week’s major news stories.
  • News Article on New Study or Report (15%): You will choose a recently published peer-reviewed study or expert report along with their accompanying news releases, where possible. These studies should relate to a New England-related issue; or be authored by a New England-based expert or organization. For this assignment, chose one that you can develop into a 700-word news story relevant to New England readership. Take care to advance the story beyond the information provided in the paper and news release by using at least one additional interview source, who you must interview in person or by phone, or by email, and one additional piece of documentary evidence. Documentary evidence includes: a report from an official organization or institution; scientific paper; speech; policy paper; research report; or book. Please note that a media statement or press release or published news item in a newspaper, magazine, online or broadcast news item does not constitute a documentary source.  You must pitch the idea and story to me by email and I must agree to it.
  • Trend or Backgrounder Article (15%): For this assignment, you must find, develop and produce an original 800-word science news trend or background story on a topic of your choice, aimed at New England readership. The story should have at least three sources. One source must be a paper published in a scientific journal. One source must be an interview. You can write the story in a hard news format; or in a format that reflects evolving online approaches to trend and backgrounder stories such as a Vox.com story. You must pitch the idea and the format to me by email, and I must agree to it.
  • News Analysis Article (15%): Choosing among the weekly thematic topics, you must write a 1,000-word news analysis article building on, synthesizing, and evaluating the research and arguments posed, pegging the issues discussed to recent events or developments with a focus that is relevant to a New England readership. You must pitch the idea and the format to me by email, and I must agree to it. You should aim to make the news analysis a well-written and seamless discussion that combines your analysis of recent news items with references to points raised in relevant course readings.
  • Commentary / Op-Ed (15%): Choosing among the weekly thematic topics, you must write a 800 word op-ed building on, synthesizing, and evaluating the research and arguments posed, pegging the issues discussed to recent events or developments with a focus that is relevant to a New England readership. Your op-ed must have a clear point of view and distinctive voice. You must pitch the idea and the format to me by email and I must agree to it. You should aim to make your commentary a well-written and seamless argument that combines your analysis of recent news items with references to points raised in relevant course readings.
  • In Depth Report or Analysis (30%): Choosing a climate change or energy topic, you must write a 2,000-word article aimed at New England readers. Choose the topic yourselves, but you must first pitch it to me by email, and I must agree to it, before you can proceed. Stories must contain at least two original interviews and at least three documentary sources: a report from an official organization or institution; scientific paper; speech; policy paper; research report; or book. Please note that a media statement or press release or published news item in a newspaper, magazine, online or broadcast news item does not constitute a documentary source. As part of this assignment, you must present in class on your story, describing how you came up with the idea, how you reported it and why you decided to report in the style and format that you chose. Crucially, you must also reflect on how the readings and class shaped your understanding of how you reported this story.

STANDARDS FOR ALL STORIES

  1. Represent yourself accurately to sources. You must always let people know you are a reporter and that your story could potentially be published at the Northeastern Climate Change Review. You must make this clear to sources. All submissions for this class could potentially be published.
  2. Do not use unnamed or anonymous sources without prior approval. Occasionally you will encounter sources who do not want to give their names, but unless there is a serious risk to the source of going on the record, you should do your best to convince them to speak on the record. You must clear any use of an unnamed or anonymous source with me before you turn in the assignment.
  3. Use proper attribution. Only live interviews may be quoted directly. Anything off a press release, Web site, statement, another article must be attributed as such.
  4. Include a source appendix. As an appendix to each assignment, please provide:
  • A list of sources that you interviewed personally for the article, the interview method (by phone, in person, via email), the interview dates, and contact details for the source (phone and email);
  • Full references to any documentary sources cited;
  • Full references to the sources of secondary information (previous articles, quotations taken from previously published material, such as previous news reports, books, etc) used in the article;
  • A list of sources of background information not cited in the article. 

BOSTON GLOBE SUBSCRIPTION

                   There are no required texts to purchase for this course. All of the assigned readings are either freely available online, by way of the Northeastern University library; or by way of major news organizations. However, you are strongly advised for purposes of this course to purchase a digital monthly subscription to the Boston Globe. Your subscription will be needed to access several assigned readings; but more importantly to research your stories and articles.

ASSIGNED NEWS READING

As part of this course, you are expected to be a voracious reader and evaluator of climate change and energy news coverage. Specifically, on a daily and weekly basis, you are expected to read the following sources and journalists. Your familiarity with their coverage will be tested as part of your weekly quizzes:

CLASS SCHEDULE / READING

 Fri. Sept 9 – Class Overview and Introductions

NEW ENGLAND’S CLIMATE & ENERGY FUTURE

Tues. Sept 13 & Fri. Sept 16 – Our Climate Change Future

  • Climate Ready Boston (2016, Spring). Climate Projections Consensus. [Read Summary Document]
  • Abel, D. (2016, June 22). Climate Change Could Be Worse for Boston than Thought. Boston Globe. [HTML]
  • Gillis, J. (2016, Sept. 3). Flooding of Coast Caused by Climate Change Has Already Begun. The New York Times. [HTML]
  • Belluz, J. (2015, Nov. 30). Why climate change is increasingly seen as an urgent health issue. Vox.com [HTML]
  • Fernandez, I.J., C.V. Schmitt, S.D. Birkel, E. Stancioff, A.J. Pershing, J.T. Kelley, J.A. Runge, G.L. Jacobson, & P.A. Mayewski. 2015. Maine’s Climate Future: 2015 Update. Orono, ME: University of Maine. [PDF]
  • Abel, D. (2014, Sept. 21). In Maine, Scientists See Signs of Climate Change. Boston Globe [HTML]
  • Woodward, C. (2015, Oct. 25). MayDay: Gulf of Maine in Distress. Portland Press Herald. 6 part series [HTML]

Tues. Sept 20 — Our Energy Future

  • Fitzgerald, J. (2016, March 12). Clean energy industry goes mainstream amid investments. Boston Globe [HTML]
  • Gillis, J. (2016, Aug. 22). America’s First Offshore Wind Farm May Power Up a New Industry. The New York Times. [HTML]
  • Turkel, T. (2016, July 10). Risky choices paying off for UMaine’s wind project. Portland Press Herald. [HTML]
  • Abel, D. (2016, May 16).  Carbon emissions rising at New England power plants. The Boston Globe [HTML]
  • Mooney, C. (2016, Aug. 11). Turns out wind and solar have a secret friend: Natural gas. Washington Post. [HTML]
  • (2016, July 29). We Must Preserve Nuclear Power Plants. Commonwealth Magazine. [HTML]
  • Mohl, B. (2016, July 31). Lawmakers give late-night OK to energy bill. Commonwealth Magazine [HTML]
  • Berwick, A. (2016, Aug. 3). Energy Bill a Solid Step Forward. Commonwealth Magazine. [HTML]
  • Gerwatowski, R. (2016, Aug. 3). The inconvenient truth of energy policy. Commonwealth Magazine. [HTML]
  • Turkel, T. (2016, July 30). Expect your electric bill to go up for the next few years. Portland Press Herald. [HTML]

Fri. Sept. 23 — NO CLASS 

WRITING ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY

Tues. Sept. 27 — Reporting on Scientific Studies and Reports

  • Siegfried, T. (2005). “Reporting from science journals”. In Blum, D., Knudson, M., & Marantz Henig, R. (Eds). A Field Guide for Science Writers: The Official Guide of the National Association of Science Writers (pp 11-17). New York: Oxford University Press. [Distributed to Class]
  • Journalist’s Resource (2011, Sept. 27)  Research chat: Andrew Revkin on covering and using scholarship. [HTML]
  • Journalist’s Resource (2016, June 1). Interviewing a source: Rules of the road; talking with officials and experts. [HTML]
  • Journalist’s Resource (2015, March 26). Eight questions to ask when interpreting academic studies: A primer for media. [HTML]
  • Borenstein, S. (2016, Sept. 7). NOAA: Global warming increased odds for Louisiana downpour. Associated Press. [HTML]
  • Kintisch, E. (2016, June 9). Is wacky weather helping melt Greenland? Science magazine [HTML]
  • Revkin, A. (2013, March 12). Can Wind, Water and Sunlight Power New York by 2050? Dot Earth blog, The New York Times [HTML]

 Friday, Sept. 30 — Trend Stories, News Analysis, and Commentary

  • Abel, D. (2016, Aug 27). Drought’s effects mount as dry weather continues. The Boston Globe [HTML]
  • Jackson, D.Z. (2016, July 22). San Diego sets an example for Mass. on renewable energy. The Boston Globe [HTML]
  • Jackson, D.Z. (2016, May 13). With Obama cuts, Mass. should rethink its reliance on natural gas. The Boston Globe [HTML]
  • Porter, E. (2016, July 19). How Renewable Energy Is Blowing Climate Change Efforts Off Course. The New York Times [HTML]
  • Porter, E. (2016, April 19). Liberal Biases, Too, May Block Progress on Climate Change. The New York Times [HTML]
  • Plumer, B. (2014, April 22). Two degrees: The world set a simple goal for climate change. We’re likely to miss it. Vox.com [HTML]
  • Merchant, E.F. (2016, March 18). Is it Game Over for Coal? The New Republic. [HTML]

Friday, Oct. 7 —  Story Angles, Frames, and Visuals

  • Nisbet, M.C. (2009). Communicating Climate Change: Why Frames Matter to Public Engagement.Environment, 51 (2), 514-518. [HTML]
  • Journalist Resource (2016, Apr 18). Localizing the climate change mitigation story in your state and region: Some data tools to use. [HTML]
  • Climate Outreach (2016). Climate Visuals – 7 Key Visuals for Climate Change Communication. (Skim Report and Visuals Web Site) [HTML]
  • Journalist Resource (2016, Apr 1). Getting started with data visualization: A quick primer to jump-start the process. [HTML]

CLIMATE CHANGE AS A WICKED PROBLEM

Tues. Oct. 4 – What Kind of Problem is Climate Change?

  • Nisbet, M. C. (2014). Disruptive ideas: public intellectuals and their arguments for action on climate change. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 5(6), 809-823. [HTML] [PDF]
  • McKibben, B. (2016, Aug. 15). A World at War: We’re under attack from climate change—and our only hope is to mobilize like we did in WWII. New Republic. [HTML]
  • Rayner, S. (2016, Aug. 31). A Climate Movement at War. The Breakthrough [HTML]

Tues. Oct. 18 & Fri. Oct. 21 — Climate Communication Challenges & Strategies

  • Nisbet, M.C. & Markowitz, E. (2016, March). Americans’ Attitudes About Science and Technology: The Social Context for Public Communication. AAAS Leshner Leadership Institute. Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science. [PDF] [Read through climate change section]
  • Geiling, N. (2014, May 7). Why doesn’t anyone know how to talk about global warming? The Smithsonian magazine. [HTML]
  • Voosen, P. (2014, Nov 3). Seeking a Climate Change. Chronicle of Higher Education. [HTML]
  • Hoffman, A. (2012). Climate Science as Culture War. Stanford Social Innovation Review. [HTML]
  • Nisbet, M.C. & Markowitz, E. (2016). Strategic Science Communication on Environmental Issues. AAAS Leshner Leadership Institute. Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science. [PDF]

Tues. Oct 25 & Fri. Oct. 28 —Journalistic Challenges & Shifting Roles

  • Gibson, T. A., Craig, R. T., Harper, A. C., & Alpert, J. M. (2015). Covering global warming in dubious times: Environmental reporters in the new media ecosystem. Journalism. [Library Gateway]
  • Brainard, C. (2015). The changing ecology of news and news organizations: Implications for environmental news. In A. Hansen and R. Cox (Eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Environment and Communication (pp.168-185). London: Routledge. [Distributed to Class]
  • Revkin, A. 2007. “Climate change as news: Challenges in communicating environmental science”. In J.C. DiMento & P.M. Doughman (Eds.).Climate Change: What It Means for Us, Our Children, and Our Grandchildren. Boston, MA: MIT Press, pp. 139-160. [PDF]
  • Fahy, D. & Nisbet, M.C. (2011). The Science Journalist Online: Shifting Roles and Emerging Practices. Journalism: Theory, Practice & Criticism, 12: 778-793. [HTML]
  • Nisbet, M.C. & Fahy, D. (2015). The Need for Knowledge-based Journalism in Politicized Science Debates. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 658, 223-234. [PDF]

JOURNALISM, ADVOCACY, AND POLITICS

Tues. Nov. 1 & Fri. Nov. 4 — Journalism and the “Climate Change Denial” Movement

  • Dunlap, R. E., & McCright, A. M. (2011). Organized climate change denial. The Oxford handbook of climate change and society, 144-160. [Google Books]
  • Feldman, L. (2016). The Effects of Network and Cable TV News Viewing on Climate Change Opinion, Knowledge, and Behavior. ORE Climate Science. [Distributed to Class]
  • Mayer, J. (2016). Dark money: The hidden history of the billionaires behind the rise of the radical right. Doubleday, pgs 198-225 [Distributed to Class]
  • Jerving, S. et al (2015, Oct. 9). What Exxon knew about the Earth’s melting Arctic. The Los Angeles Times [HTML]
  • Lewandowsky, S., Oreskes, N., Risbey, J. S., Newell, B. R., & Smithson, M. (2015). Seepage: Climate change denial and its effect on the scientific community. Global Environmental Change, 33, 1-13. [HTML]
  • Howarth, C. C., & Sharman, A. G. (2015). Labeling opinions in the climate debate: a critical review. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 6(2), 239-254. [Library Gateway]
  • Colford, P. (2015, Sept. 22). An addition to AP Stylebook entry on global warming. Associated Press. [HTML]

Tues. Nov. 15  The Election: What Happened and What’s Next?

  • Guillen, A. et al (2016, Nov. 12). Trump’s win upends climate fight. Politico. [HTML]
  • Revkin, A. (2016, Nov. 9). Prospects for the Climate, and Environmentalism, Under President Trump. New York Times [HTML]
  • Plumer B. (2016, Nov. 9). There’s no way around it: Donald Trump looks like a disaster for the planet. Vox.com [HTML]
  • Brooks, D. (2016, Nov. 11). The View from Trump Tower. The New York Times [HTML]
  • Greenwald, G. (2016, Nov. 9). Democrats, Trump, and the Ongoing, Dangerous Refusal to Learn the Lesson of Brexit. The Intercept. [HTML]

Friday Nov. 19 — Sicence, Journalism and Advocacy in Turbulent Times

  • Donner, S. D. (2014). Finding your place on the science–advocacy continuum: an editorial essay. Climatic change, 124(1-2), 1-8. [PDF]
  • Stephenson, W. (2012, Nov. 5). A Convenient Excuse. The Boston Phoenix [HTML]
  • Nisbet, M.C. (2015, Oct. 23). MIT rejects fossil fuel divestment but is still a leader on climate change. The Conversation. [HTML]

 

CATCH UP, NEW TOPICS, DISCUSS ASSIGNMENTS

Tues. Nov. 29 – Tues. Dec. 6

###

Partisan pandemics: Political divisions likely to impact U.S. perceptions of Zika threat

August 1, 2016 —In the lead up to the 2016 Olympics in Brazil, global news attention has focused on the impact of the Zika virus in the country, including efforts to halt the spread of the mosquito-borne virus across Latin America, the Caribbean, and other regions.

People who contract Zika are unlikely to experience symptoms. Those who do develop signs of infection experience a few days of body aches, rash, and fever, though in some cases there are more severe neurological and autoimmune effects. For many experts, this makes the Zika virus a potentially less serious public health problem than the lethal mosquito-transmitted pandemics of malaria and dengue.

Yet it is the special risk to infants that has galvanized worldwide attention. Among pregnant women, contracting Zika increases the risk of birth defects, including microcephaly, in which an infant’s head and brain do not fully develop. In Brazil, there have been more than 5,000 confirmed cases of microcephaly associated with Zika.

Summertime temperatures are likely to bring to the United States the first non–travel-related cases of Zika. The mosquito species that is the primary carrier of the virus ranges across the South and Southwest and stretches into states including Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, New Jersey, and parts of New York. But outbreaks in the United States are likely to be limited compared to other countries. Better housing, window screens, and air conditioning are far more common than in poorer countries, and the states that are most likely to be affected have substantial experience in preventing and containing such diseases.

Still, the public opinion dynamics surrounding the past pandemics of swine flu and Ebola suggest that worry among Americans is likely to escalate, intensifying across summer months and into the fall. Concern will be driven not only by saturation news coverage of the Olympics and a possible outbreak in the United States but also by a highly polarized presidential election campaign.

Doubts about a Swine Flu Vaccine

In spring 2009, the first cases of swine flu were reported in Mexico with other cases soon identified in the United States and around the world. By June 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced that the swine flu outbreak was the first worldwide pandemic in forty years. When, several months later, an emergency vaccine was made available to the American public, whether or not an individual said they planned to be vaccinated depended strongly on their partisan outlook and their trust in government.

At the outset of the pandemic, surveys indicated that swine flu had quickly come to dominate Americans’ attention, as 82 percent of Americans said they were following the story, making the pandemic one of the most followed news stories of the year. At the time, it was also the most followed story about infectious disease in history, topping SARS, West Nile Virus, and mad cow disease, though swine flu would soon be eclipsed in 2014 by Ebola virus (see figure 1) (Pew 2009a).

 

The amount of public attention to swine flu during spring 2009 was not surprising given that a third of total news coverage across media outlets focused on the virus. No other issue came close. Even the still-faltering economy captured only 10 percent of total news coverage. Later that year in October, public attention spiked again as news coverage focused on the public availability of a vaccine (Pew 2009a; 2009b). But efforts to offer the vaccine to the public soon became politically controversial, as misleading claims about safety spread by way of talk radio and social media, leading many Americans to say they would forego vaccinations (Steinhauer 2009).

In the context of these false claims, there were strong differences in public perceptions. Half of Republicans said news reports were overstating swine flu’s danger, compared to 35 percent of Democrats (Pew 2009a). More troubling, only 41 percent of Republicans said they would get vaccinated, compared to 60 percent of Democrats (Pew 2009a). Further analysis showed that trust in government was ultimately the key driver of decisions to be vaccinated. In contrast to their Democratic counterparts, Republicans were less likely to believe that the Obama administration could handle the swine flu problem, and as a consequence, were less likely to say that they were willing to take the vaccine (Mesch and Schwirian 2015).

The Ebola Outbreak and Election Politics

In December 2013, the first Ebola epidemic in history broke out in West Africa. By mid-2014, the epidemic had dramatically intensified. From July 2014 to October 2014, monthly reported cases in Guinea and Sierra Leone increased from 500 in each country to a peak of nearly 3,000. By January 2016, when the WHO declared the epidemic officially over, there had been more than 28,000 reported cases in West Africa and 11,300 confirmed deaths.

In the United States, there were a total of four confirmed Ebola cases and one related death. Yet by early October 2014, despite little to no risk of contracting the disease, 32 percent of the U.S. public said they were very or somewhat worried about Ebola. Two weeks later, as media attention to the epidemic intensified, worry had spread to 41 percent of the public. At the start of the month, Americans regardless of partisan identity expressed similar levels of worry. But two weeks later, worry among self-identified Republicans had grown from 33 percent to 49 percent. In comparison, worry among self-identified Democrats had shifted more modestly from 30 percent to 36 percent (see Figure 2) (Pew 2014).

In mid-October 2014, at the peak of concern, a review of polls shows that about half of the public (45 percent) said they were either very or somewhat worried that they or their family would become sick with Ebola. Fears of infection subsequently declined as no other U.S. cases were reported. Still, by November 2014, Americans ranked Ebola as the third most urgent health problem facing the country, just below cost and access to health care and ahead of cancer and heart disease (which combined to account for nearly half of all U.S. deaths annually; see SteelFisher et al. 2015).

A review of polling evidence suggests several key factors that led to a public fear over Ebola that was substantially out of proportion to the actual nature of the threat. First, surveys indicate that false beliefs about Ebola were widespread. For example, Ebola is not airborne and is not contagious until someone shows symptoms. Yet 85 percent of Americans believed that if sneezed or coughed on by a symptomatic individual, a person is either very likely or somewhat likely to get Ebola (SteelFisher et al. 2015).

A second factor was the saturation nature of news coverage particularly on network TV and cable news. By one tally, CNN, NBC, and CBS aired nearly 1,000 evening news segments about Ebola between mid-October and early November. The personalization of coverage around the two American nurses and one doctor who were infected with Ebola at the expense of more contextual, thematic coverage likely helped intensify public concern (SteelFisher et al. 2015). Cable news and talk radio also framed the U.S. government’s response to Ebola in strongly political and partisan terms, making it easy for Republicans and others who disliked the Obama administration to discount reassurances from health officials that there was little need to worry.

Like in the case of swine flu, a third related factor was public confidence in the government. Although 57 percent of the public said they had a great deal or fair amount of confidence in the government to prevent an Ebola outbreak, there were predictably strong partisan differences in opinion. By mid-October, 67 percent of Democrats said they had confidence in the government compared to only 41 percent of Republicans who said the same (Pew 2014; SteelFisher et al. 2015).

Preparing for the Zika Controversy

As of spring 2016, similar public opinion dynamics to swine flu and Ebola were already observable in the case of Zika. Public attention quickly spiked in reaction to news of the threat. Nearly 60 percent of Americans in February 2016 said they were following news about Zika either very closely or fairly closely (DiJulio et al. 2016).

At the same time, public knowledge was low. Though nine out of ten Americans knew that the virus spread by mosquitoes, 40 percent did not know the virus could be sexually transmitted, and 31 percent incorrectly believed that the virus could be transmitted through coughing and sneezing (Joseph 2016). By March 2016, 68 percent said they were familiar with news reports of the issue and 50 percent said that the issue concerned them. Much of this concern, however, was likely rooted in false beliefs, as 42 percent thought incorrectly that it was likely someone would die from Zika if infected, and that the mosquito that carries the disease could be found in every state (Annenberg 2016).

As news coverage of Zika increases leading up to the Olympics and as the first cases are reported in the United States, the presidential election campaign is likely to intensify political conflict over Federal funding for prevention and possible limits on immigration. In this context, false claims and misinformation are likely to rapidly spread, and partisan messaging is likely to be strong. It would not be surprising, then, for Democrats and Republicans to start to split in their perceptions of the threat, in their trust in the response of government agencies, and in their support for different types of policy actions.

In this new era of partisan pandemics, public health officials need to expand their investment in localized and regional communication strategies that can effectively reach the public below the level of national political debate. This includes building relationships with local media and opinion leaders, and the capacity to rapidly respond to misinformation. The expert community should also continue to cultivate strong relationships with leaders across the political spectrum, including respected nonpartisan voices such as military and faith-based leaders who can affirm expert consensus on the nature of the risks and what is needed in response (see SteelFisher et al. 2015).

–This article originally appeared in the July/August 2016 issue of Skeptical Inquirer magazine.

Citation:

Nisbet, M.C. (2016). Partisan Pandemics. Skeptical Inquirer, 40 (4), 21-23.

References:

Don’t fear a Franken public: The surprising reasons why we should label genetically modified foods

May 1, 2016—In January 2016, Campbell Soup generated headlines by announcing that it would voluntarily label its products containing genetically modified (GM) corn, soy, beets, and other crops. Like most food industry leaders, about three quarters of Campbell Soup products contain such ingredients.

The company’s announcement came in advance of a summer deadline set by Vermont requiring the labeling of GM foods sold in the state. Legislatures in more than twenty states have considered similar requirements. Food industry groups have lobbied for congressional legislation preempting any state requirements, encouraging voluntary disclosure. But Campbell Soup is notable for breaking with this strategy, calling instead for mandatory labeling (Strom 2016).

Contrary to the claims of “Frankenfood” opponents, research shows that Americans have not turned against the promising technology. Most remain unaware of the debate. If asked directly, Americans voice support for labeling, but these opinions are neither deeply held nor top of mind.

In this context, Campbell Soup’s strategy is a shrewd gamble that could lead to several counterintuitive yet welcome outcomes. If Americans were to encounter GM labels on almost all processed foods, the ubiquity and apparent safety of such foods may actually bolster public trust and confidence, quelling controversy and opening the door to a next generation of GM food products that offer enormous benefits.

Science vs. Movement Politics

According to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and other expert organizations, GM foods in comparison to other food products do not pose substantial risks to human health. Thus, federal regulators, experts, and industry members argue that there is no scientific or legal justification for special labeling.

Yet a few discredited studies provide just enough rhetorical fodder for activists to falsely claim that the technology poses a health threat. In the face of such uncertainty, they argue that precaution should be the rule. Therefore, consumers have a “right to know” if they are consuming GM ingredients.

For these activists, the debate over the scientific justification for labeling is a smokescreen that clouds deeper-rooted grievances. In this sense, no amount of scientific evidence will soften their opposition. The origin of these grievances can be traced to the rise of America’s local food movement.

During the early 2000s, looking across survey findings, researchers concluded that most Americans were unaware of GM food products, lacked basic knowledge of the science or policy specifics involved, and had yet to form strong opinions about the issue (Shanahan et al. 2001).

But among a smaller segment of consumers, the issue was emerging as a chief concern, correlated with a cluster of other food-related attitudes. Those few Americans who said they actively looked to buy GM-free food also said that they preferred their food to be organic, vegetarian, natural, locally produced, not processed, and without artificial colors or flavors (Bellows et al. 2010).

These consumers were early adopters of many of the beliefs and preferences that constitute today’s local food movement. The origins of the movement date back to the 1980s and a series of food safety controversies. Since then influential activists, food writers, and documentary filmmakers have argued the connections between industrial food production, agricultural policy, and problems such as obesity, income inequality, food-borne illness, and the decline of community life (Pollan 2010). In doing so, they have contributed to a new food politics, helping a diversity of groups unify behind a movement pushing for food system reforms.

From Portland, Maine, to Portland, Oregon, many regions have rebuilt their economies and identities around locally owned, mostly organic farms, restaurants, and artisanal foods. These local efforts are complemented by the popularity of well-known national organic brands such as Stonyfield Farms and Horizon. In 2014, U.S. consumption of organic fruits, vegetables, dairy, breads, meat, and other foods generated an estimated $35 billion in sales, more than triple the amount from a decade ago (USDA n.d.).

The growth in the organics industry and local food economies has created a formidable alliance of farmers, entrepreneurs, and activists who bring considerable money, influence, and voice to the debate over labeling. For this alliance, corporate controlled, “unnaturally” produced GM food is perceived as a direct threat to their livelihood and preferred way of life.

Labeling: Not a Big Deal?

Simmering at the grassroots level for years, in 2012 the labeling of GM food exploded into prominence as a hotly debated political issue. In successive years, California, Washington, Oregon, and Colorado residents considered and eventually voted down proposals to label GM food products. In these battles, the food industry is estimated to have spent more than $100 million to block labeling efforts, while activists and organic industry members spent tens of millions promoting the measures.

These battles across Western states generated considerable national media coverage. Yet despite the attention, carefully designed survey research suggests that broader public awareness remains remarkably low. For at least a decade, the great majority of processed foods sold in grocery stores have contained ingredients from GM crops. But when asked in a 2013 Rutgers University survey about the matter, only 44 percent of Americans said they were aware of such foods, and only 26 percent believed that they had ever eaten any food with GM ingredients (Hallman et al. 2013).

A majority of Americans in 2013 said they know very little or nothing at all about GM foods, and 25 percent said they had never heard of them. Even among those who answered they were aware of the issue, a majority mistakenly believed that GM tomatoes, wheat, and chicken products were being sold in supermarkets (Hallman et al. 2013). Specific to labeling, if asked directly, 80 percent of the public said that it was either “very important” or “somewhat important” to know whether a product contains GM food. Yet these labeling preferences are weakly held. In the 2013 Rutgers survey, when respondents were asked in an unprompted way “What information would you like to see on food labels that is not already on there?” only 7 percent said GM food labeling. Moreover, only one in four Americans knew that federal regulations do not currently require such labels (Hallman et al. 2013).

Given the public’s ambivalence about labeling, economists have long questioned claims that labeling would deter the great majority of consumers from purchasing GM food products. For most Americans, cost and brand preference rather than labeling drives their food choices. To the extent that most organic foods today cost 50 to 100 percent more than their GM counterparts, this price difference is likely to override any impact of labels.

To test these assumptions, economists Marco Costanigro and Jayson Lusk designed a series of experiments that asked a sample of American adults to choose among apples and Cheerios that were either labeled as genetically modified or were unlabeled. To simulate the price differences for these products, those marked as genetically modified were priced at half the cost of their unlabeled counterparts. Across conditions, the economists did not observe any significant impact of labeling on risk perceptions or concern. Subjects rated GM apples and Cheerios just as safe as their non-modified counterparts. The economists, however, did find that a GM label made consumers somewhat more willing to pay a premium for unlabeled apples and Cheerios. In other words, though GM labels are unlikely to raise undue alarm among consumers, such labels may indirectly help boost sales of organic food products (Costanigro and Lusk 2014).

Citing this research and other evidence that labels are not likely to scare the public, some experts have argued that if the food industry were to follow the lead of Campbell Soup and support a mandatory labeling law, the strategy would help to restore public trust in the food industry while defusing controversy. “People are getting increasingly scared of [GM food] precisely because the industry is fighting a rearguard battle not to tell people which foodstuffs contain them,” argues author and writer Mark Lynas (2013). “This has to be the worst PR strategy ever: can you think of a single analogy where an industry uses every media tool, every electoral and legal avenue possible to stop people knowing where their own products are used?”

As David Ropeik (2013), a risk communication consultant, argued in an open letter to the food industry: “Even if you win the vote, you will lose the war … because the war isn’t about labeling. It’s about the public’s lack of trust in you, and therefore their opposition to the technology that is so important to your success. Your company’s opposition to labeling is hurting you far more than it’s helping. It is time for a new approach.”

Defusing Controversy

Certainly if the food industry were to support mandatory GM labeling, the precise impact on consumers remains unkown. But to continue to battle against labeling rules is also risky business, lending credibility to claims by activists that the industry has an undue, corrupting influence on the political process. In contrast, the labeling of GM food may have only a limited impact on consumer buying habits, while doing little to alarm the public about the safety of the technology. Putting an end to the labeling controversy is also likely to benefit public debate over the next generation of genetically engineered foods, ensuring that scientists, universities, and companies have the freedom to pursue breakthrough technologies.

These innovations are aimed directly at helping the world meet a 70 percent increase in food demand by 2050. Some crops have been engineered to counter deficiencies in vitamin A and iron among populations in developing countries. Other GM crops are able to survive under conditions of drought, extreme heat, or unfavorable soil conditions (Wohlers 2013). After many years of evaluation, in 2015 a genetically engineered salmon became the first modified animal approved for human consumption by the U.S. government. The small company that pioneered the high-tech salmon says that they can be grown in half the time and using 25 percent less small wild fish as feed. The system recycles 95 percent of the water used and reduces harmful waste. The all-female sterile fish are raised in landlocked tanks, making escape into the wild unlikely. Currently produced in Panama, the plan is for the fish to be grown close to large U.S. urban areas, reducing the energy costs associated with transportation (Saletan 2015).

Activists have moved quickly to oppose such “Frankenfish,” pressuring major grocery store chains and restaurants to refuse to sell the sustainability-friendly product. Apart from unsupported claims about environmental and health risks, their chief complaint is that the fish would not be labeled. As the case of engineered salmon suggests, as important high-tech crops and farming practices are brought to market in coming years, the chief strategy of GM food opponents to appeal to the public’s “right to know” can be removed from the table by pushing for a smart, mandatory labeling policy.

–This article originally appeared in the May/June 2016 issue of Skeptical Inquirer magazine.

Citation:

Nisbet, M.C. (2016, May/June). Don’t Fear a Franken Public: The surprising reasons why we should label genetically modified food. Skeptical Inquirer magazine, 18-21.

References

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Bellows, A.C., G. Alcaraz, and W.K. Hallman. 2010. Gender and food, a study of attitudes in the USA towards organic, local, US grown, and GM-free foods. Appetite 55(3): 540–550.
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Costanigro, M., and J.L. Lusk. 2014. The signaling effect of mandatory labels on genetically engineered food. Food Policy 49: 259–267.
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Hallman, W.K., C.L. Cuite, and X.K. Morin. 2013. Public perceptions of labeling genetically modified foods. Working Paper 2013-01. Rutgers Uni-
versity. Available online at http://sebsnjaesnews.rutgers.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2014/06/RU-GM-labelingper
ception-white-paper-2013.pdf.
  • Lynas, M. 2013. It’s time to label GMOs: Why we need to move biotech out of the shadows. The Breakthrough.org (October 23). Available online at http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/programs/conservation-and-development/its-time-to-label-gmos.
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Pollan, M. 2010. The food movement, rising. New York Review of Books (June). Available online at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2010/06/10/food-movement-rising/.
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Ropeik, D. 2013. GMO labeling: An open letter to BigAgTech CEOs. The Huffington Post (November 6). Available online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-ropeik/gmo-labeling_b_4224023.html.
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Saletan, W. 2015. Don’t fear the Frankenfish. Slate.com (November 20). Available online at http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2015/11/genetically_engineered_aquabounty_salmon_safe_fda_decides.html.
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Shanahan, J., D. Scheufele, and E. Lee. 2001. Trends: Attitudes about agricultural biotechnology and genetically modified organisms. The Public Opinion Quarterly 65(2): 267–281.
Strom, S. 2016. Campbell labels will disclose G.M.O. ingredients. The New York Times (January 7). Available online at http://nyti.ms/1ORR7EN.
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USDA n.d. Organic market overview. United States Department of Agriculture. Available online at http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/natural-resources-environment/organic-agriculture/organic-market-overview.aspx.
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Wohlers, A.E. 2013. Labeling of genetically modified food: Closer to reality in the United States? Politics & Life Sciences 32(1): 73–84.

Will the health dangers of climate change get people to care? The science says: maybe

April 7, 2016 —Climate change is a major public health threat, already making existing problems like asthma, exposure to extreme heat, food poisoning, and infectious disease more severe, and posing new risks from climate change-related disasters, including death or injury.

Those were the alarming conclusions of a new scientific assessment report released by the Obama administration this week, drawing on input from eight federal agencies and more than 100 relevant experts.

“As far as history is concerned this is a new kind of threat that we are facing,” said U.S. Surgeon General Vivek Murthy at a White House event. Pregnant women, children, low-income people and communities of color are among the most at risk.

Despite ever more urgent warnings of scientists, Americans still tend to view climate change as a scientific or environmental issue, but not as a problem that currently affects them personally, or one that connects to issues that they already perceive as important.

Yet research suggests that as federal agencies, experts, and societal leaders increasingly focus on the public health risks of climate change, this reframing may be able to overcome longstanding public indifference on the issue. The new communication strategy, however, faces several hurdles and uncertainties.

Putting a public health focus to the test

In a series of studies that I conducted with several colleagues in 2010 and 2011, we examined how Americans respond to information about climate change when the issue is reframed as a public health problem.

In line with the findings of the recent Obama administration report, the messages we tested with Americans stressed scientific findings that link climate change to an increase in the incidence of infectious diseases, asthma, allergies, heat stroke and other health problems – risks that particularly impact children, the elderly and the poor.

We evaluated not only story lines that highlighted these risks, but also the presentations that focused on the benefits to public health if actions were taken to curb greenhouse emissions.

In an initial study, we conducted in-depth interviews with 70 respondents from 29 states, recruiting subjects from six previously defined audience segments. These segments ranged on a continuum from those individuals deeply alarmed by climate change to those who were deeply dismissive of the problem.

Across all six audience segments, when asked to read a short essay that framed climate change in terms of public health, individuals said that the information was both useful and compelling, particularly at the end of the essay when locally focused policy actions were presented with specific benefits to public health.

In a follow-up study, we conducted a nationally representative online survey. Respondents from each of the six audience segments were randomly assigned to three different experimental conditions in which they read brief essays about climate change discussed as either an environmental problem, a public health problem or a national security problem. This allowed us to evaluate their emotional reactions to strategically framed messages about the issue.

In comparison to messages that defined climate change in terms of either the environment or national security, talking about climate change as a public health problem generated greater feelings of hope among subjects. Research suggests that fostering a sense of hope, specifically a belief that actions to combat climate change will be successful, is likely to promote greater public involvement and participation on the issue.

Among subjects who tended to doubt or dismiss climate change as a problem, the public health focus also helped diffuse anger in reaction to information about the issue, creating the opportunity for opinion change.

A recent study by researchers at Cornell University built on our findings to examine how to effectively reframe the connections between climate change and ocean health.

In this study involving 500 subjects recruited from among passengers on a Seattle-area ferry boat, participants were randomly assigned to two frame conditions in which they read presentations that defined the impact of climate change on oceans.

For a first group of subjects, the consequences of climate change were framed in terms of their risks to marine species such as oysters. For the second group, climate change was framed in terms of risks to humans who may eat contaminated oysters.

The framing of ocean impacts in terms of risks to human health appeared to depoliticize perceptions. In this case, the human health framing condition had no discernible impact on the views of Democrats and independents, but it did influence the outlook of Republicans. Right-leaning people, when information emphasized the human health risks, were significantly more likely to support various proposed regulations of the fossil fuel industry.

In two other recent studies, the Cornell team of researchers have found that communications about climate change are more persuasive among political conservatives when framed in terms of localized, near-term impacts and if they feature compassion appeals for the victims of climate change disasters, such as drought.

Challenges to reframing climate change

To date, a common weakness in studies testing different framing approaches to climate change is that they do not evaluate the effects of the tested messages in the context of competing arguments.

In real life, most people hear about climate change by way of national news outlets, local TV news, conversations, social media and political advertisements. In these contexts, people are likely to also encounter arguments by those opposed to policy action who misleadingly emphasize scientific uncertainty or who exaggerate the economic costs of action.

Thus our studies and others may overestimate framing effects on attitude change, since they do not correspond to how most members of the public encounter information about climate change in the real world.

The two studies that have examined the effects of novel frames in the presence of competing messages have found mixed results. A third recent study finds no influence on attitudes when reframing action on climate change in terms of benefits to health or the economy, even in the absence of competing frames. In light of their findings, the authors recommend that communication efforts remain focused on emphasizing the environmental risks of inaction.

Communicating about climate change as a public health problem also faces barriers from how messages are shared and spread online, suggests another recent study.

In past research on Facebook sharing, messages that are perceived to be conventional are more likely to be passed on than those that are considered unconventional. Scholars theorize that this property of Facebook sharing relates closely to how cultures typically tend to reinforce status quo understandings of social problems and to marginalize unconventional perspectives.

In an experiment designed like a game of three-way telephone in which subjects were asked to select and pass on Facebook messages about climate change, the authors found that a conventional framing of climate change in terms of environmental risks was more likely to be shared, compared to less conventional messages emphasizing the public health and economic benefits to action.

In all, these results suggest that efforts to employ novel framing strategies on climate change that involve an emphasis on public health will require sustained, well-resourced, and highly coordinated activities in which such messages are repeated and emphasized by a diversity of trusted messengers and opinion leaders.

That’s why the new federal scientific assessment, which was promoted via the White House media and engagement offices, is so important. As these efforts continue, they will also need to be localized and tailored to specific regions, cities, or states and periodically evaluated to gauge success and refine strategy.

–This article originally appeared at The Conversation US.

Citation:

Nisbet, M.C. (2016, April 7). Will the health dangers of climate change get people to care? The science says: maybe. The Conversation US.

References

Myers, T., Nisbet, M.C., Maibach, E.W., & Leiserowitz, A. (2012). A Public Health Frame Arouses Hopeful Emotions about Climate Change.  Climatic Change Research Letters, 1105-1121.

Maibach, E., Nisbet, M.C. et al. (2010). Reframing Climate Change as a Public Health Issue: An Exploratory Study of Public Reactions. BMC Public Health 10: 299

Shifting the conversation about climate change: Strategies to build public demand for action

March 1, 2016 —Late last year at the United Nations climate change summit in Paris, world leaders reached a historic accord committing their countries to lowering greenhouse gas emissions over the next two decades and beyond.

The combined commitments by countries fall short of what many scientists say is needed to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, but the Paris accord marks an essential first step. World leaders pledged to revisit their commitments every five years with the goal of ratcheting up efforts to rapidly reduce emissions.

Yet over the next decade, as the United States joins with other countries in a quest to decarbonize the world economy, it will be essential to also ratchet up U.S. public opinion.

The challenge is to move the majority of Americans who remain ambivalent about the issue toward greater support for government action.

Recent studies, including several that I have conducted, suggest a portfolio of related communication strategies that can help shift the conversation about climate change, building public demand for solutions.

Talking Up Consensus

As simple as it might sound, perceptions of scientific consensus on climate change serve as a key “gateway belief,” influencing other beliefs about the issue, which in turn shape support for policy action, report Sander van der Linden and colleagues (2015) in a recently published study.

Even for individuals who closely follow the issue, it is impossible to track the latest scientific findings or studies about climate change, much less parse the many complexities involved. Instead, as with medical questions or technology issues, most people use what they perceive as the consensus opinion of relevant experts as a mental short cut.

On the issue of climate change, the problem is that many members of the public are not very good at accurately estimating the true level of scientific consensus. Surveys of climate scientists and comprehensive reviews of thousands of peer-reviewed studies confirm the same basic fact: at least 97 percent of climate scientists say that human-caused climate change is happening (see Doran and Zimmerman 2009; Anderegg et al. 2010; Cook et al. 2013). One study, in fact, indicates the consensus is actually as high as 99.9 percent (Powell 2015). Yet recent surveys find that only one out of ten Americans correctly estimate agreement among climate scientists as greater than 90 percent (Leiserowitz et al. 2014).

To evaluate strategies for correcting perceptions of expert consensus, van der Linden and his colleagues (2014) tested the effects of different variations on the same message: “97% of climate scientists have concluded that human-caused climate change is happening.” In one experimental condition, subjects were presented just with the text of the message. In a second condition, the text was paired with a pie chart visually conveying the level of consensus. In other conditions, subjects were presented with variations on a relevant metaphor such as, “If 97% of engineers concluded that a particular bridge is unsafe to cross, would you believe them? 97% of climate scientists have concluded that human-caused climate change is happening.”

Across each of their experimental conditions, boosting awareness of scientific consensus increased beliefs that climate change is happening, that it is human caused, and that it is a worrisome problem. These shifts in beliefs in turn increased subjects’ support for policy action, with some of the biggest increases observed among Republicans, who tend to be more dismissive of the issue (van der Linden et al. 2015). Interestingly, in comparison to the tested metaphors, subjects who received either the simple text statement or the pie chart displayed the greatest increase in their beliefs.

Metaphors are especially useful for explaining complex mechanisms related to climate science, reasoned van der Linden and his colleagues (2014), but when trying to convey the strength of scientific consensus, “presenting information in a way that is short, simple, and easy to comprehend and remember seems to offer the highest probability of success for all audiences examined,” they concluded.

Reframing the Debate

As we educate the public about scientific consensus, evidence suggests we also need to reframe the focus of debate. Americans tend to view climate change as a scientific or environmental issue, but not as a problem that affects them personally or that connects to issues that they already perceive as important.

Successfully reframing climate change means remaining true to the underlying science of the issue while applying research to tailor messages to different audiences, making the complex issue understandable and personally important (see Nisbet 2009).

For example, in a series of studies conducted with several colleagues, we examined how Americans respond to information about climate change when the issue is framed as a public health problem. A public health focus stresses scientific findings that link climate change to an increase in the incidence of infectious diseases, asthma, allergies, heat stroke, and other health problems, risks that differentially impact children, the elderly, and the poor.

To test the effects of this frame, in an initial study, we conducted in-depth interviews with seventy respondents from twenty-nine states, recruiting subjects from six previously defined audience segments. These segments ranged on a continuum from those individuals deeply alarmed by climate change to those who were deeply dismissive of the problem. Across all six audience segments, when asked to read a short essay that framed climate change in terms of public health, individuals said that the information was both useful and compelling, particularly at the end of the essay when locally focused policy actions were paired with specific benefits to public health (Maibach et al. 2010).

In a follow-up study, we conducted a nationally representative online survey in which respondents from each of the six audience segments were randomly assigned to three different experimental conditions allowing us to evaluate their emotional reactions to strategically framed messages about climate change. In comparison to messages that defined climate change in terms of either the environment or national security, talking about climate change as a public health problem generated greater feelings of hope among subjects. Research suggests that this emotion helps promote greater public involvement and participation on the issue. Among subjects who tended to doubt or dismiss climate change as a problem, the public health focus helped defuse anger in reaction to information about the issue, creating the opportunity for opinion change (Myers et al. 2012).

Working with a Diversity of 
Opinion Leaders

The research on consensus messaging and framing suggest easy-to-adopt talking points and novel lines of emphasis that scientists and other experts can use in face-to-face conversations, presentations, meetings, media interviews, and via social media. Yet to ratchet up public engagement with climate change, scientists and experts will also have to be joined by a variety of opinion leaders from across sectors of society, trusted voices that can influence otherwise difficult-to-reach audiences (see Nisbet and Kotcher 2009).

Studies, for example, have identified TV weathercasters as an especially important community influencer. Local TV broadcasts remain the top news source for a majority of Americans, and most say they watch the local news primarily for the weathercast. Given their training, visibility, reach, and trusted status, weathercasters hold the unique ability to describe how local weather conditions, such as heat waves, drought, or heavy precipitation, may be related to climate change.

Connecting the dots on such events is important. Research shows that when people understand that they have personally experienced the effects of climate change, they are more likely to be concerned about the issue and to support a variety of policy actions (Placky et al. 2015). To date, more than 250 local weathercasters in the United States representing 185 stations and 105 media markets have been recruited to include regular “Climate Matters” segments as part of their broadcasts, using easily adopted visuals that are localized to specific audiences.

A longitudinal study evaluating a pilot program at a local TV station in Columbia, South Carolina, found that after one year of regular Climate Matters segments, viewers of the station’s broadcast had developed a more science-based understanding of climate change than viewers of other local news stations (Placky et al. 2015). Pope Francis’s recent effort to reframe climate change in terms of religious duty and social justice is another example of the impact that trusted voices can have on public opinion.

Following the release of the pope’s encyclical on the subject and his visit to the United States this past year, 17 percent of Americans and 35 percent of Catholics reported that the pope’s position on climate change had influenced their views. In comparison to six months prior to the pope’s visit, significantly more Americans were likely to say that climate change is a moral issue, a social fairness issue, and a religious issue (Maibach et al. 2015). These findings provide strong evidence that the pope’s reframing of climate change had an impact on how the public thinks about the problem, connecting to widely shared values that transcend political differences.

The Need for Compromise

Ratcheting up public support for government action on climate change not only requires a sophisticated, research-based understanding of effective communication approaches but also an acceptance that there are strong limits to what even the best-funded and most carefully planned strategy can accomplish. Research findings evaluating different communication strategies are often messy, complex, and difficult to translate into practice. They are also subject to revision based on new research, changes in the dynamics surrounding an issue, or in applying across policy decisions and social contexts. Moreover, no matter how knowledgeable and adept experts and their partners might be in applying research to their communication efforts, progress on climate change will ultimately require the different sides in the debate to give ground, negotiate, and compromise. In the case of climate change, the major question therefore is whether public demand for action and the openness to compromise will happen too late, preventing society from successfully avoiding the most serious risks.

–This article originally appeared in the March/April 2016 issue of Skeptical Inquirer magazine.

Citation:

Nisbet, M.C (2016, March/April). Shifting the Conversation about Climate Change: Strategies to build public demand for action. Skeptical Inquirer magazine, 24-26.

References

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